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Abstract 
 
In 18.6% (11.5%) of rural (urban) Indian households in 1999, somebody (usually female) 
had to devote an average of 47 (42) minutes per day to fetching water – time which could have 
been put to other productive uses. This paper uses micro data from the 1998-99 Indian Time Use 
Survey (ITUS) conducted in Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya, Orissa and 
Haryana (covering 77,593 persons in 18,591 households) to examine the relative quantitative 
importance of social capital and of inequality in land ownership and caste status for the 
availability of tap water. Water supply illustrates two important problems of development – the 
organization of collective action which can potentially improve well-being and the distribution of 
the benefits of such co-operative behaviour. Time use data provides a natural metric for Social 
Capital, since the ITUS provides direct observation of time spent in individual social interaction 
outside the home, and in group or community activities.  The paper provides strong evidence for 
the conflicting impacts of group-based and community-based activities on social capital, in the 
Indian context, and for the importance of inequalities in income, land ownership and caste status 
for public goods provision.  
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Social Capital and Basic Goods:  
The Cautionary Tale of Drinking Water in India 
 
“The human right to water”, declares the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, “entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and 
affordable water for personal and domestic use.” 
        - Human Development Report (UNDP 2006:77)  
 
“a minimum water requirement for human survival under typical temperate climates with 
normal activity can be set at three liters per day. … in tropical and subtropical climates, it is 
necessary to increase this minimum slightly, to about five l/p/d, ... A further fundamental 
requirement .. is that this water should be of sufficient quality to prevent water related diseases.” 
     -  Gleick  (1996:84) 
  Humans are all alike in facing the basic constraint of time and in needing water to drink 
every day. As well, water is needed for sanitation, bathing and food preparation. Adding all 
water needs together, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1992)
1 suggested 
that 15 litres per person per day is the minimum necessary while the Human Development 
Report (2006) of UNDP sets a standard of 20 litres per capita per day. Whatever the exact level 
of this basic need, the residents of developed countries (and the majority of Indian citizens) can 
simply turn the tap
2 and satisfy it immediately, but in approximately 18.6 % of rural Indian 
households (and 11.2% of urban households) somebody (usually female) has to spend an average 
of about ¾ of an hour per day fetching it. This paper is about the causes of inequality in access to 
this basic necessity of life. 
Who has to fetch water and why do they not now have the access that most people take 
for granted? This paper begins in Section 1 with an overview of water collection in India and a 
brief description of the Indian Time Use Survey of 1998-99. Section 2 develops a simple model 
of water provision whose main feature is inequality in net individual benefits from collective 
water supply and the potential role played by social capital in helping to solve the problem of 
organizing collective action. Section 3 then suggests that a natural metric for local social capital 
is the average amount of time that local residents spend in social interaction and in group or 
community activities, and it examines the relative importance for the supply of water of 
community and group level social capital and of inequality in land and in caste. Section 4 
concludes.   4
1.   Overview 
1.1  Basic Needs and the Time Burden of Carrying Water 
  Water is a physiological requirement for human survival, but the daily burden of carrying it 
does not fit neatly into current debates on basic necessities and poverty. The World Bank, for 
example, begins its training manual on the measurement of poverty with the general statement: 
“Poverty is “pronounced deprivation in well-being.”,” but emphasizes (2005:8) that the starting 
point for most analyses of poverty is to define “well-being” in terms of “command over 
commodities in general
3, so…. poverty is then measured by comparing an individual’s income or 
consumption with some defined threshold below which they are considered to be poor. … (while) 
… a second approach to well-being (and hence poverty) is to ask whether people are able to obtain 
a specific type of consumption good.” Although the Human Poverty Index of the UNDP includes, 
as one of its components, the percentage of the population
4 “without sustainable access to an 
improved water source”, it goes on to define “reasonable access” as “the availability of at least 20 
litres a person per day from a source within 1 kilometre of the user’s dwelling”. As any reader can 
easily check, carrying this amount of water for a four person family (i.e. 80 litres per day) is hard 
work
5 – and a return journey of up to two kilometres takes significant time. Hence, having 
“access” to water does not capture the burden of this daily task.  
Sen’s “capabilities” approach to thinking about deprivation is perhaps the closest in spirit 
to the current paper, but carrying water is a task, not a capability. For those individuals who 
physically cannot carry water, individual capability may be crucially important. However, for 
most people – i.e. most women (it is easy to observe that this task is very unequally shared 
within households) – the problem is not that they cannot do this job, but the fact that doing it 
subtracts from the time and energy available for other tasks. 
Whether the task of carrying water is small or large depends on the local community’s 
facilities for water provision – i.e. carrying water is an individual task but the availability of 
piped water is a community characteristic. Piping water to a dwelling, rather than having to carry 
it in a bucket, is about as clear an example of capital/labour substitution that improves well-being 
as one can find – but the affluent can afford to dig their own private wells, so it is the poor  who 
have to spend a significant part of every day carrying water, and who consequently have a clear 
claim to be experiencing “pronounced deprivation in well-being.” The construction and 
maintenance of public water distribution infrastructure requires community organization and the   5
literature on social capital stresses the facilitating role of social interaction and group 
membership for that community organization – but the fact that the affluent do not now have to 
carry water is likely to be crucially important in determining their support. Analysis of the time 
people spend carrying water therefore raises, in a very concrete way, some central concerns 
about inequality, gender, public goods provision and social capital in the development process. 
1.2   Data Description 
Between June, 1998 and July, 1999, the Central Statistical Organization of India 
conducted a pilot Time Use Survey (the ITUS). A stratified random sampling design, as followed 
in the National Sample Surveys (NSS), was used to survey 18,591 households (12,750 rural and 
5,841 urban) with 77,593 persons, of whom 53,981 were rural and 23,612 were urban residents. 
The survey was conducted in four rounds during the year to capture seasonal variations in the 
time use patterns of the population. Two person teams of male and female interviewers stayed in 
each village or urban block for nine days to compile time diaries for normal, abnormal and 
weekly variant days. Respondent households were first visited to assess their weekly pattern of 
time use and then revisited to complete a full diary of activities concerning the previous day for 
all household members over six years of age. Although the sample design was explicitly 
constructed to capture differences in time use between normal and weekly variant or abnormal
6 
days, in practice Hirway (2000:24) noted that “On an average, of the total 7 days, 6.51 were 
normal, 0.44 weekly variant day and 0.05 was abnormal day… in rural areas people continue 
their normal activities on holidays also.” This paper therefore focuses on time use on “normal” 
days. 
   As Pandey (1999:1) noted: “India has lot of socio-economic, demographic, geographic 
and cultural diversities. To ensure that all aspects of diversities are captured,  Haryana, Madhya 
Pradesh, Gujarat, Orissa, Tamil Nadu and Meghalaya were chosen to represent northern, central, 
western, eastern, southern and north-eastern regions respectively.” Although one might wonder 
whether six states’ data could fully capture the diversity of India, Hirway (2000: 11) has argued 
“cross-checking of the results has confirmed that the sample is fairly representative of the 
country.” In any event, this data would be interesting even were this not the case, i.e. even if the 
data were only seen as a sample of the 233 million people inhabiting these six states. 
  Figure 1 plots the distribution of total water collection time in the households who have 
to collect water while Table 1 presents some basic descriptive statistics on who collects water in   6
rural and urban areas – throughout this paper we examine rural and urban areas separately. 
Within each panel of Table 1, the left column reports the percentage of all time spent, by all 
people, collecting water. Column R1 indicates, for example, that in rural areas approximately 
1.3% of all water fetching work is done by boys and another 7.0% is done by adult men. Column 
U1 shows that in urban areas boys do 0.3% of this work and men do about 11%. The conditional 
probability that, if a household has to collect water, a particular type of person will have to do it 
is given in columns R2 and U2 of Table 1. Since bar graphs may help to confirm visually the 
relative size of demographic differences, Figures 2 and 2A show the relative probability, and 
percentage of total water collection time, of boys, men, girls and women. Clearly, “carrying 
water” is a heavily gendered task – in both the urban and rural areas of India, adult women do 
about 87% of this kind of work
7.  
The third columns in each panel report the average time spent in a normal day by people 
who have to collect water. For those people who have to do it, carrying water is clearly a 
significantly important task. As column R3 shows, on the average rural women who fetch water 
spend more time (47 minutes daily) than rural men (40 minutes), but approximately the same 
time as boys (48 minutes). Moreover, in rural households where the girls are sent to do this task, 
it is little more onerous (50 minutes per day). Column U3 indicates that the time spent on water 
collection is actually not very different in urban areas, except for girls, who spent much less 
time. 
In our sample, there is a wide range of variation across individual villages and districts in 
the percentage of people who are members of scheduled castes or scheduled tribes, but the 
percentage of scheduled caste members and of other castes who collect water is not very 
different (36.0% as compared to 34.7%) and neither is the length of time required (48 minutes 
daily as compared to 45 minutes). As the bottom row of Table 1 indicates, paid collection of 
water is very small relative to unpaid household collection – in rural areas only 1.2% of water 
collection time was paid, and in urban areas only about 1.4%. This paper will therefore focus on 
unpaid collection of water for household use.  
2. A Simple Model of the Supply of Tap Water 
Wherever they live, humans must have some source of water supply – what determines 
whether the infrastructure to deliver tap water is constructed or whether households have to carry 
water from whatever source exists? Water is not a classic “public good” since it is both rival in   7
consumption and easily excludable in access. But because wells, reservoirs, piping and other 
water production facilities have significant indivisibilities and economies of scale
8 and because 
the efficient distribution of water often requires piping or aqueducts which may have to cross 
many individuals’ properties, in most countries the public sector is deeply involved in provision 
of water infrastructure
 9.  
In affluent nations, tap water supply is nearly universal, but, as Table 1 indicates, in 
developing countries like India coverage is far from complete.  Piped water delivery requires the 
construction of distribution facilities that in India are often far beyond the means of individual 
households. In addition to the fixed cost of pumping stations and the marginal costs of piping 
and maintenance, there is a cost to the negotiations required to arrange construction and the 
rights of way needed for water distribution – negotiations which are more difficult because the 
benefits of piped water are unequally distributed.  
  For a simple model to capture the inequality of net benefits in water distribution, we start 
by abstracting from the specificities of geography and assuming that a point source of water – a 
well with finite capacity – now serves a population that is uniformly distributed on a featureless 
plain. Suppose that this well can supply N households spread uniformly over a radius D from the 
well head. Since each individual household is located at a given distance from the well, we can 
summarize the cost in time and effort of collecting water from the well for household i with 
opportunity cost of time wi  as a fixed time cost of filling containers (wi c) and a linear function of 
distance (wi di), which can be represented as line OC in Figure 4. 
We assume that the technology of tap water supply is characterized by the fixed cost of 
digging a well and maintaining a pumping station, whose annualized value is given by b0, and a 
constant per meter marginal cost of connective piping and maintenance (annualized to be b1). 
Conditional on individuals closer to the well already being connected to the distribution system, 
the marginal cost function (b1) can be represented as the line MC in Figure 4. 
The piped water system would pass an aggregate cost-benefit test if the aggregate gains 
from time savings cover the fixed and variable costs – i.e. if NSB>0. 
NSB = Σi (wi c + wi di) – (b0 + b1D)      [1] 
The average total technical cost (ATTC) of water supply per household is given by: 
ATTC  = (b0 + b1D ) / N         [2]   8
The main point of Figure 4 is to illustrate a dilemma in piped water systems. The benefits 
to an individual household of the piped water system (wi c + wi di) vary with distance from the 
wellhead (di) and opportunity cost of time (wi). Households located close to a point source of 
water have the least to gain from piped water supply, because their current time costs of carrying 
water are smaller – indeed Figure 4 is drawn to illustrate the (extreme) case where households 
closest to the well are not willing to pay even the marginal cost of connection. However, more 
distant households can only connect at the marginal cost of service (b1) if the pipe system already 
serves those of their neighbours who are nearer the water source. 
  The household’s opportunity cost of time (wi) in other work depends on their human 
capital stock. There is also a pure wealth effect (e.g. from land ownership) on wi, via the income 
elasticity of demand for leisure, conditional on human capital. For an individual household, the 
cost of digging a private well sufficient for the household’s own use is plausibly less than the 
fixed cost of a well and pumping station big enough for the local district, but even if it is not, for 
sufficiently large values of wi  one will observe (wi c + wi di) > b0 . Although collective provision 
at an average total cost of (b0 + b1D)/N  would usually be cheaper than self provision, if 
collective provision cannot be arranged, the affluent  will find it worthwhile to dig their own 
private wells. 
     A pure market based system of water supply could involve a very complicated game of 
bluff, hold-up and reneging on contracts
10. Since no agent would otherwise make irrevocable 
investments in fixed cost facilities and piping, some credible institutions for the enforcement of 
long term contracts would be needed. Substantial transactions costs in bilateral 
monopoly/monopsony bargaining would also be incurred if each household were to buy from 
their upstream neighbour and try to exploit their market power over downstream neighbours. The 
non-existence of long term contract enforcement institutions is arguably a crucial part of the 
development problem – but even in highly developed market systems, the provision of water to 
households is usually done by public utilities, or under strict public regulation.  
Organizing collective action faces, however, the problem that inequality in the net 
benefits of a piped water system is inherent, since the opportunity cost of not having a water 
distribution system depends on the distance water must otherwise be carried and is accentuated 
by any inequality in the opportunity cost of time w – which will vary with household wealth, in 
both human capital and land ownership. As well, if water carrying is a gendered task and if the   9
benefits of piped water in saved labour are received by women while the cash costs of municipal 
water rates are paid partly by men, inequality in power within households will affect the 
perceived net benefits of the family patriarch, who may be the relevant “voter”. 
Even if all individuals realize that there are economies of scale in water supply that imply 
a net surplus is created by joint action, will households co-operate in the collective provision of 
water? Knowing that more distant neighbours would be willing to pay more to avoid carrying 
water, and that piping systems need transit rights to serve them, will households closer to the 
source attempt to exploit their location advantage – perhaps by arguing they should pay less than 
the average total cost of collective provision? If proxies for the opportunity cost of time (wi) are 
observable, and if the less affluent know that the relatively rich would be willing to pay more, 
will they attempt to pass more of the costs onto their richer neighbours? Discriminatory pricing 
of water based on location and income may be technically feasible, but if such differential 
pricing is perceived to be unfair, these perceptions could undermine the social co-operation on 
which collective water systems depend. The model of this section therefore ignores the 
possibility of differential pricing and argues that the basic issue determining whether a collective 
community water system exists is whether the median voter
11 will support a community water 
supply authority which prices at average total cost. 
Institutions (like water supply authorities) do not, however, drop without cost from the 
sky. A costly process of negotiation is needed to establish a public authority and determine its 
policies. If all individuals received the same benefit from the public authority, such negotiations 
could be short, as all could agree immediately on the optimal policy. Negotiation is necessary if 
interests diverge and tends to be more protracted if mutual trust is absent. We presume that the 
total cost of negotiation depends multiplicatively on both the total absolute difference between 
residents in the net benefits they will receive from the water system [    j i j i u u − Σ Σ ] and the level 
of mutual mistrust.  
If we summarize “mistrust” as a parameter b2, Equation 3 expresses the total cost of 
water supply (TC) as the sum of the technical and negotiation costs – i.e. fixed costs (b0) and 
variable costs of connection (b1D) plus negotiation costs. 
[3]                           2 1 0 j i j i u u b D b b TC − Σ Σ + + =    10
Average costs of piped water supply (ATC) are then given by Equation 4
12. If the crucial 
issue for political support of a water authority is whether or not the critical voter is better off (i.e. 
whether ATC < OC), this implies that the important variables are the fixed cost of supply and the 
degree of inequality in the benefits of piped water and of mistrust. 
[4]              













3. Why do some households have to collect water? 
The question “Why do some households in India have to collect water?” really has two 
components:  
1] Why do some localities have tap water while others do not?  
2] Why, when local facilities exist, do some households not benefit, because they are not 
connected to the local water distribution system?  
The likelihood that a particular household will have to spend time fetching water is a 
compound probability – one minus the product of the probability [P1] that tap water is available 
from a local well or pipe system and the conditional probability [P2] that the household can 
connect to the local distribution system, if it exists. In our data, we observe this compound 
probability, and the issues we want to examine are the characteristics of communities that 
determine the local availability of drinking water and the characteristics of households that 
determine access to locally available supplies. The discussion above suggests that one should 
expect the probability of tap water availability to depend negatively on average total cost, so that 
(writing σ for a measure of inequality in the opportunity cost of time wi) one would expect: 
P1 = f1(b0 , b1D, b2 ,σ)       [5] 
Isham and Kähkönen (2002) have also emphasized the benefits of village level social 
capital for the effective design, implementation and maintenance of rural water projects in rural 
India and Sri Lanka. The impacts of greater mistrust (b2) on costs of water provision may 
therefore enter via multiple paths - in higher initial negotiation costs and in increasing the fixed 
and variable technical costs of water supply (b0 and b1) (also see Isham and Kähkönen (1999) on 
water in Java). In equation [5], the technical costs of water provision (summarized in b0, b1D) 
and the levels of mistrust (b2) and inequality (σ) are characteristics of the community. Whether 
an individual household can connect to an available local network plausibly depends on their 
household disposable income (yi), and on whether they are a member of a socially excluded   11
group (Si). One could then write the conditional probability of tap water access as in [6] and the 
compound probability of fetching water (i.e. one minus the probability of having piped water) as 
in [7]. 
P2 = f2(yi, Si)        [ 6 ]  
[1 - P1 P2  ]= f3(b0 , b1D, b2 ,σ, yi, Si )     [7] 
3.1  Social Capital, Other Community Characteristics and Access to Water 
Why might a community characteristic such as “mistrust” (which we have summarized as 
parameter b2 ) vary across localities and thereby affect an individual household’s access to tap 
water? The provision of tap water illustrates the linked problems of [1] organizing collective 
action, which can potentially improve the well-being of all residents of a locality and [2] 
distributing the benefits of such co-operative behaviour. If a local community can successfully 
organize the production of good quality schooling, water supply, roads or sanitation, the initial 
benefits will be greatest for the poor who now do without, and least for the affluent who can now 
purchase private substitutes - but all can benefit from longer term economic development. What 
determines whether this happens? 
 In recent years, a vast literature
13 has stressed the importance of local “social capital” for 
the organization of co-operative action – either in direct voluntary supply of local infrastructure 
or in the mobilization of political pressure which produces government action. The World 
Bank’s website on Social Capital is particularly rosy: 
 “Social Capital refers to the norms and networks that enable collective action. It  
encompasses institutions, relationships, and customs that shape the quality and  
quantity of a society's social interactions. Increasing evidence shows that social  
capital is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be  
sustainable. Social capital, when enhanced in a positive manner, can improve  
project effectiveness and sustainability by building the community’s capacity to  
work together to address their common needs, fostering greater inclusion and  
cohesion, and increasing transparency and accountability
14.” 
Putnam (2000:19) has variously defined “social capital” as “connections among 
individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from 
them” or as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate co-
ordination and co-operation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1993). For Woolcock and Narayan   12
(2000: 227) “social capital refers to the norms and networks that enable people to act 
collectively”.  
Phrased in this way, “social capital” sounds inherently positive, but norms and networks 
are specific to particular cultures and historical periods. As many authors have noted, “social 
capital” and associational life can be either positive or negative in its implications for 
development. Norms and networks can “bond” individuals into mutually exclusionary, divisive, 
small social groups or “bridge” social groups and thereby link individuals within the wider 
society. Ethnic and religious tensions (such as the long conflict in Northern Ireland, or the 1980s 
civil war in Lebanon) which undermine development may be partly the product of  strong within 
group bonding, as well as abysmally high inter-group mistrust – and the “collective action” of 
social groups in that context can either accentuate or reduce communal mistrust. Although 
Mogues and Carter (2005) are representative of a large literature which sees local social capital 
as essentially positive and potentially determinative of the co-operative behaviour on which 
development depends, “collective action” in the pursuit of communal conflict can also be 
disastrous for development. 
As Mogues and Carter note, individuals invest time in relationships with others to 
produce a valuable personal asset – their network of relationships. Aggregating these individual 
networks will produce a set of social networks. Since “knowing people who know people” 
generates indirect social contacts, network-building has economies of scale – but the extent of 
any pre-existing divisions within the wider community will limit the potential scope of indirect 
contacts. Individuals can try to optimize their personal investment in social capital but each 
individual will, in their network building, always have to work within the constraints on social 
interaction which their local society has inherited from the past. The amount of “bridging” social 
capital which might positively affect development, compared to the “bonding” of individuals 
into narrow sub-groups, depends on both the strength of inherited social divisions and the 
intensity and type of current social interaction among local residents. 
If some aspects of social capital are positive for development, while other aspects might 
be negative, how might one test the social capital hypothesis?  How might one empirically 
measure “social capital” – and distinguish between “bridging” and “bonding” social capital? 
Might it sometimes be the case that the positive impacts of “bridging” activities are outweighed 
by the negative influences of “bonding” into divisive sub-groups?   13
One strand of the social capital literature has relied on summary questions which ask 
respondents to indicate their level of trust in others. Knack and Keefer’s much cited 1997 results 
reporting the positive impacts of social capital on economic growth relied, for example, on the 
World Values Survey question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” As they note, responses to such 
general questions mingle how much trust one places in people who are not close friends or 
relatives, and the frequency of encounters with such persons, which makes it impossible to 
distinguish bridging and bonding effects. 
Other researchers have attempted to measure the prevalence of local networks by 
querying individuals about their associational memberships and their participation in local 
community and political activities. Narayan and Pritchett (1999a, 1999b), for example, argued 
that Tanzanian villages in which individuals belonged to more groups were also richer (and that 
the relationship was causal) – a finding about the importance of associational life that conflicted 
with Knack and Keefer’s (1997:1251) conclusion that: “Membership in formal groups—
Putnam’s measure of social capital—is not associated with trust or with improved economic 
performance”. 
An important issue in this debate is how one might want to measure “Associational life”.  
If a person is asked: “Are you, or is someone in your household, a member of any groups, 
organizations or associations
15?”, the self-identification of memberships may be highly 
subjective, unless groups are very formalized
16 – which seems likely to be rare in most instances, 
particularly in less developed countries. The raw number of associational memberships is an 
index which weights equally the intensive and marginal involvements of individuals, and which 
does not differentiate the purposes and types of associations. On the other hand, index numbers 
with arbitrary aggregation properties
17 may produce econometrically fragile results. 
This paper argues that the time spent in associational activities is, in many ways, a natural 
metric for associational life. If social interaction between persons happens, it takes time – and 
should show up in time use diaries. The minutes of time people spend in group or community 
activities provides a natural unit for aggregation – unlike aggregation across different types of 
associations and activities, which faces the problem that, because there is no natural way to add 
up associations, researchers must construct arbitrary indices. As well, the total time spent on an 
activity is a natural and comparable measure of each person’s intensity of involvement – unlike   14
subjective grading by respondents of intensity of participation in associations, which cannot be 
interpersonally comparable. Additionally, when respondents are asked for recall data on 
associational memberships, no aggregate consistency check on total memberships is possible - in 
contrast to the time diary constraint that the aggregate length of all of a day’s activities must sum 
to 24 hours.  Because the time diary method of data collection walks respondents through a 
specific day’s activities from morning to evening, it provides both a narrative spur to more 
complete respondent recall of particular events and a consistency check on total reported 
activities. 
In coding the time use of Indian respondents, it is clear that the ITUS designers were 
highly conscious of the social capital literature. Both formal political and “civil society” types of 
interaction and informal socialization were separately identified and coded. For the purposes of 
this paper, it is particularly important that the ITUS distinguished between informal social 
interaction (such as Talking, Gossiping and Quarreling - 951) and formalized associational 
interactions. Furthermore, under the general heading of activities identified as Community 
Services and Help To Other Households: the ITUS specifically distinguished between 
community based activities
18 and group activities
19. The  community based activities are 
specifically defined to correspond to the sort of “bridging” associations that bring benefits to the 
entire community, but it is an open question whether such usages of time as “participation in 
meetings of local and informal groups/caste, tribes, professional associations, union, fraternal 
and political organisations (651)” are bonding individuals into narrow sub-groups, based partly 
on pre-existing divisions (such as caste) or linking individuals across narrow interest groups. 
   As Putnam (2000) argues (and as any practicing politician can attest) personal 
connections and networks of trust are the basis of political organizing and civil society. The 
informal social interactions on which such networks depend occur both at social events and in 
casual encounters. The ITUS data reports the time individuals spend in “SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL ACTIVITIES, MASS MEDIA, ETC.”  As Table 2 indicates, casual encounters and 
“Talking gossiping quarrelling” are common – in rural (urban) areas, 44.56% (28.72%) of 
adult
20 men and 29.39% (28.59%) of adult women report doing some of this, for an average of 
33.75 (20.46) minutes for men and 19.85 (18.22) minutes for women. (Note that the 
impossibility of distinguishing between informal “talking”, “gossiping” or “quarrelling” as 
different activities and the ambiguity associated with whether one would expect them to have a   15
positive or negative impact for development illustrates somewhat concretely the broader 
ambiguity in the implications of social capital for development.)  
However, many important time uses are not of daily frequency, for any specific 
individual. Social events
21 are, for example, somewhat episodic – on any given randomly 
selected normal day one only observes about one male in twenty engaged in a recorded social 
event, with an average duration of about one hour and twenty minutes
22. Our hypothesis is that 
time use data can be used as an index of the social interaction that produces social capital and 
reduces mistrust (b2). However, aggregating the average amount of time spent in each local area 
on all types of social interaction – community work, group activities, social activities and casual 
conversation – into a single total amount of local social interaction would presume that all types 
of social interaction have a common influence on mistrust (b2). We prefer to test explicitly the 
assumption that they all have the same impact on social capital, and therefore the same impact on 
the provision of local public services.  
  An econometric issue which we must address is possible endogeneity between time spent 
collecting water and social time – at least for women. More time spent collecting water clearly 
means less time available for all other things, but because water carrying is such a highly 
gendered task, it is highly unlikely that male socialization time is directly affected by the 
availability of tap water. Since we can measure separately the average social time of men and the 
average social time of women – both of which arguably might be important for social 
networking – we can check whether there is any difference in results when we examine the 
impacts of male social time, female social time or both aggregated.  To sidestep the endogeneity 
issue, Table 3 in the main body of the text reports results using just male social time as well as 
male and female time – but Table A3 in the Appendix reports estimation results using only 
female social time, which are essentially similar. 
A second possible source of endogeneity problems would be to include community work 
on water projects (activity code 611) as an explanatory variable predicting tap water availability. 
In this paper we therefore drop activity code 611 from the measure of time use in community 
activities. 
  In the Indian context, many of the administrative decisions which affect local villages or 
urban blocks are taken by the different administrative districts
23 within which they are located 
(within the six states examined
24). As local political units, it is arguably the districts which are   16
the locus within which social capital will have its impact (or not), so this paper focuses on 
differences across districts in outcomes, but uses as potential explanatory variables the inequality 
both among villages in the same districts and within villages.  
Table 3 reports probit regression results estimating Equation [7] above for rural 
households (i.e. the probability that a members of a given rural household will spend some time, 
in a normal day, collecting water) while Table 4 presents urban results. Since we are concerned 
that our results not be sensitive to sampling error, both Tables report average estimated 
coefficients and standard errors from 1,000 bootstrapped replications.  
In time diary data one cannot generally expect to observe “lumpy” types of events every 
day – although, for example, people who dine out with friends three times a week might be 
thought to be highly sociable, they still have four chances in seven of being at home on any 
random evening. Episodic usages of time have, therefore, to be analyzed in terms of the 
conditional expectation of a particular time use, on a randomly selected normal day – but this 
implies that estimation of the probability of low frequency events (like participation in 
community functions) may be susceptible to variability in small samples.  The bootstrapping 
procedure described in Efron and Tibshirani (1993), Mooney and Duval (1993) and Davison and 
Hinkley (1997) is therefore particularly appropriate for our purposes. It can be summarized as 
follows. 
Let b, b ˆ, k and N denote the true population value of a coefficient, estimate of the 
coefficient from a probit regression, the number of bootstrapping iterations, and the number of 
observations in the original sample, respectively. We draw a random sample (with replacement) 
of N observations from the original sample and estimate a probit regression. We repeat this 
process k times. Let 
*
i b  denote the estimate of the coefficient in the i
th iteration (i=1,…,k). The 

















= . The bias in b ˆ can be estimated as  ) ˆ (
*
b b − . Since this bias has an indeterminate 
amount of random error, it is best to use b ˆ as the point estimate of b (rather than 
*
b , which is the 
bias subtracted from b ˆ).
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In both Tables 3 and 4 we include Model A in the first column as a cautionary example of 
the importance of disaggregating time use. In Model A, time spent by men and women in all 
types of community and group activities
26 are added together and averaged. However, in the 
remaining four columns of each table, community work and group activities are separately 
identified and average social time and inequality are differently measured. In Models B and C, 
average social interaction time is computed for all adults, while in Models D and E we use only 
male adults’ social time. Columns B and D are estimated using the Theil index of inequality in 
land holding and monthly expenditure while columns C and E use the square of the coefficient of 
variation – since we want an index of inequality that is decomposable into within district and 
between district components of inequality (see Jenkins, 1991). 
We present all these specifications because we want to examine the robustness of our 
results. Looking first at individual characteristics, the tendency of economists is to think of price 
and income effects as possible explanatory variables in predicting household demand for a 
service (such as tap water) – but the size of such effects, relative to the influence of other 
possible explanatory variables, is an empirical issue. The ITUS data does not contain any direct 
measurement of the money price of water but hook-up charges or local taxes to defray 
distribution costs may still imply that “ability to pay” could be a significant barrier to having tap 
water, even where it is locally available. 
In both Tables 3 and 4, the household’s monthly per capita expenditure is consistently 
and significantly negatively associated with having to fetch water, with a somewhat larger 
coefficient in urban than in rural areas. However, since the respondents to the ITUS were asked a 
single summary question about total average monthly expenditures by the household (rather than 
the series of questions on categories of consumption which a household expenditure survey 
would use to add up total consumption) we are cautious about possible measurement error in this 
variable
27 – particularly since it is unlikely to include self-production of food and fuel. 
Moreover, since digging one’s own well, or connecting to a local pipe system, represents 
an investment with a long term return in time and energy, one could arguably expect wealth and 
not income to be the more important individual household determinant of access to tap water. If 
one interprets occupation as indicator of human capital wealth, the negative coefficient on 
“professional” (e.g. engineer, doctor etc.) household status in Table 3, predicting the probability 
of fetching water, may reflect human capital wealth, and the significant positive association with   18
greater number of dependents is also consistent with this interpretation. However, in Table 3 the 
statistical insignificance of landlessness, home ownership and a dummy variable “laborer” 
(indicating that more than 50% of income is from agricultural or other labour status) can be read 
as indicating that these variables have little additional explanatory power in rural areas that is not 
already captured in monthly expenditure. These results contrast with the urban evidence in Table 
4 of positive correlation of labourer status and water carrying and the negative coefficient on 
home ownership status (both are strongly statistically significant). Hence, we have some 
evidence for a greater relative impact of “ability to pay” as a determinant of lack of access to tap 
water in urban, compared to rural areas. Notably, there is no evidence in either Table 3 or 4 for 
discrimination in water access against female headed households or scheduled castes or tribes. 
Whether or not citizens can mobilize effectively for collective action, the cost of supply 
of tap water depends partially on cost of provision
28.  National water resources data
29 provide 
estimates of replenishable ground water reserves per capita in different states. Clearly, the less 
easily local wells can be dug to access water, the more likely it is that a particular household will 
have to fetch it. In both Tables 3 and 4 this proxy for technical cost of supply has the expected 
negative sign, is stable in empirical magnitude and is highly statistically significant in all 
specifications. 
Given the technical cost of water facilities, provision will be more likely where co-
operative action can be more readily organized – this paper attempts to assess the relative 
quantitative importance of social interaction, and of the type of social interaction, compared to 
the structural barriers of caste and class. This is possible because the novelty in time use data is 
its direct observation of time spent in social interaction, whose impacts can be compared in 
magnitude to the impact of inequality in land ownership, income and caste status. Indian villages 
are divided both by the social barriers of membership in Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
and by economic inequality in household income and land ownership.  
A clear implication of the social capital perspective on local public goods provision (see 
equation [7] above) is the expectation that a household’s probability of having to fetch water will 
be higher where there is greater economic inequality (e.g. in land ownership) and where the 
percentage of scheduled castes and tribes in the district’s population is higher. Of course, this 
expectation is not exactly new. A long tradition in thinking about development in India has 
emphasized the barriers of caste and class
30. As Habyarimana et al (2006:23) have also noted:   19
“From Pakistan to Indonesia and from rural Kenya to the United States, a growing literature 
suggests that the relationship between diversity and the underprovision of public goods is not 
simply an artefact of differences in wealth or patterns of residential mobility. It appears that 
ethnic diversity has an independent (negative) impact on the likelihood that communities can 
organize collectively to improve their welfare.” 
The innovation in the social capital approach is its optimistic perspective that social 
interaction can create networks of mutual trust that facilitate co-operative action, given the 
structural divisions of ethnicity, class and caste. However, when we added together the time 
spent in both community and group activities, we got the results reported in Model A of Tables 3 
and 4. Contrary to the social capital model, Model A indicates that time spent on community and 
group activities is strongly statistically significant and positively associated with having to fetch 
water – i.e. is negatively associated with local public goods provision. It was only when we 
examined separately the impacts of community work and group activities that it became clear 
that associational life within groups has a very different role to play in India than wider 
community involvement. 
In Tables 3 and 4, the average time spent by local people in community work is 
negatively associated with having to fetch water but the coefficient on time spent in group 
activities is strongly statistically significant (at 1%) and positive in all specifications – a result 
which we take to indicate the possible importance of “bonding” within narrow in-groups defined 
by occupation, caste and class. Apparently, not all forms of associational life necessarily foster 
development.
31 
In the Indian context, caste activities are a form of associational life that is by its nature 
exclusionary.  The ITUS specifically asked respondents about their involvement in caste groups 
(activity code 651), and since politics in India (especially rural India) is strongly influenced by 
caste affiliations, caste may also play a role in participation in political and civic activities too 
(activity code 661). The above result would then highlight the disadvantages of caste based 
associational life.  
The caste system is a controversial and contentious issue and even today considerable 
disagreement exists among scholars.
32 Some authors have argued that the defining characteristic 
of the caste system is hierarchy.
33 However, recent scholarship (e.g. see Chatterjee (1993) and 
Gupta (1993 b)) has argued that difference and not hierarchy is important. In either case, caste   20
based associational life has been, and continues to be competitive and conflictual. Gupta (2001), 
for example, argues that: “The distinguishing characteristic of the caste order is the discrete 
character of its constituent units that resist being forced into a single hierarchical frame. As these 
castes are discrete and semaphore their separation on multiple fronts, caste competition is built in 
at various levels” and “Nor is it true that caste politics is a recent phenomenon. All through 
traditional and medieval India castes have fought and slaughtered each other to gain worldly pre-
eminence.” 
While caste based associational life may build strong bonds within the caste-group, the 
counterpart of that within-group solidarity may be schisms and mistrust within the larger 
society.
34 Our results on the negative impacts of time spent in group activity in India are 
therefore consistent with the many studies
35 that have found that ethno-linguistic fragmentation 
leads to lower or inferior provision of public goods and to lower growth. However, although our 
results using this Indian data can be seen as a cautionary counter-example to the hypothesis that 
more associational life and a more active “civic society” are necessarily and unambiguously a 
“good thing”, we do not mean to imply that “group” activities are inherently divisive. Our 
argument is that such activity is historically and culturally specific in its implications for social 
capital – and we note that the associational life in Tanzania which Narayan and  Pritchett (1999a, 
1999b) found to be so positive was the associational life of a society which developed a unique 
model of rural ujamaa socialism in the late 1960s, which was itself based on earlier traditions of 
mutual help and a lack of local class distinctions in rural areas (see Nyerere, 1968). Hence, we 
see no contradiction in finding that group activity in a different cultural context, at a different 
time, has a different impact on social capital and development. 
Table 3 indicates that in rural areas both average time spent in social engagements and in 
casual “talking, gossiping, quarrelling” are highly statistically significant, and negatively related 
to having to fetch water – but Table 4 shows a different set of impacts in urban areas. The 
different specifications within each table address the substantive point of whether or not, in a 
patriarchal society, it is male social interaction or social interaction among all adults that matters 
for local public goods provision.  Comparing columns B and D, and comparing columns C and 
E, leaves the same impression – adding female social interaction time to male social time 
changes the coefficient observed, but it generally does not make a statistically significant 
difference. However, the coefficient on average community work time in columns D and E is   21
about four times larger than in columns B and C, which can be interpreted as an indication that in 
India involving men in community work is particularly important.   
The coefficients on casual social interaction and social activities are much smaller than 
those on community work in Table 3, but all these variables are negatively and statistically 
significantly associated with a greater probability that rural Indian households will have to fetch 
water – which is consistent with Putnam’s perspective on the positive social externalities of 
social interaction and with the World Bank’s recent emphasis on “social capital” in development. 
In urban areas, Table 4 provides similar evidence for the importance of community work, but 
also indicates that “gender matters” for the somewhat different implications of social activity 
time and casual gossiping and talking when we look at all adults (Models B and C) or just males 
(Models D and E). 
Tables 3 and 4 indicate that in both urban and rural areas the percentage of the local 
population that is scheduled caste or scheduled tribe is generally strongly positively correlated 
with the chance of having to fetch water. Given that the locality has piped water, there is no 
evidence for individual level discrimination (indeed Table 4 shows an anomalous negative 
association between scheduled caste and fetching water in urban areas). Since a decision to 
allocate priority in water supply infrastructure construction between villages can be buried within 
the bureaucracy while a decision to deny connection rights to an existing system within a village 
is obvious, it is quite plausible that district governments may discriminate between localities, 
even if village officials do not discriminate between individuals. 
Because land ownership is a meaningful indicator of wealth inequality in rural areas, but 
not urban areas, this variable appears in Table 3, but not Table 4. A robust result is that the 
percentage of landless households is strongly positively associated with the chance of having to 
fetch water. However, we do not get robust results on the impact of inequality in land ownership 
among the landed, which appears to depend crucially on the index of inequality used. 
Statistical significance does not necessarily imply quantitative importance. Furthermore, 
a policy such as land redistribution would, for example, affect both the percentage of households 
landless and the inequality of land ownership among the landed – i.e.  the marginal impact of 
each independent variable, considered separately, may sometimes be misleading. Table 5 
therefore presents the change in probability of having to fetch water corresponding to alternative 
“ceteris paribus” type thought experiments
36, using the regressions reported in Tables 3 and 4.   22
The underlying probability of having to fetch water, evaluated for a “typical respondent” – i.e. a 
non-female headed, non-scheduled caste or tribe, non-labourer, non-professional, non 
homestead-owning household with sample average income, average number of dependents and 
average district and village inequality in caste and class – is 0.185 in rural areas and 0.115 in 
urban areas.  
Table 5 indicates that a thought experiment like “equalizing agricultural land ownership” 
(which would set to zero both inequality in rural land ownership among the landed and the 
percentage landless) is simulated to decrease the probability of having to fetch water by about a 
third. If all households were to have the same chance of connection to water supply as 
professional households, the decline in probability of fetching water would be about a sixth in 
rural areas, and about a third in urban areas. If the median district of residence were instead to 
have zero members of Scheduled Castes, the proportion of households fetching water might fall 
by about one fifth in rural areas, and one eighth in urban areas. A 10% or 20% increase in the 
individual household’s monthly expenditure levels would have a fairly small impact in rural 
areas, but a much larger impact (an elasticity of about 0.5) in urban areas. However, the 
difference in probability of fetching water associated with homeowner and renter status in urban 
areas is the single largest observed difference in the data.  
By contrast, large changes in socialization patterns have relatively small, and offsetting, 
associations with the probability of fetching water. Simulation of a thought experiment of 
increasing time spent in social activities in rural areas from that typical of the median to that 
typical of the 90
th decile of districts is associated with a decline of one sixth in chances of 
fetching water, while such a change in community time is associated with a decline of about one 
eleventh – but a similar change in group activities would have an impact of about a sixth in 
increasing the probability of fetching water.  
Our results are therefore consistent with the view that some types of social interaction 
help, but that land reform, and a reduction in caste barriers, are the crucial issues in the social co-
operation which is the basis for local public goods supply in rural India. In urban areas, 
individual economic advantage, as indicated by professional occupational status or home 
ownership, is the key to whether or not a household has to collect water – and households in 
districts in which average group activity time is particularly high (i.e. 90
th percentile compared to 
median) are more than twice as likely to have to collect water.   23
4. Implications 
We hope that this paper has demonstrated the value of time use data in measuring social 
interactions and “social capital” and in showing the relative empirical importance of inequality in 
land ownership and caste, compared to the size of the impact of social interaction, in determining 
public services – like the probability that a household will have to fetch water. We interpret our 
results to indicate that although the recent literature on “social capital” has provided important 
insights into the development process, the cleavages of caste and class are fundamental, in the 
Indian context – as the early literature on Indian economic development emphasized. 
Some readers might not be surprised by evidence on gendered inequality in carrying 
water. Some readers might also find our documentation of the importance of inequalities of caste 
and class in India unsurprising. Even if this is the case, given that drinking water is a basic good, 
there is some point in documenting these inequalities. Our main contribution is perhaps in 
providing a cautionary counter-example to excessive optimism that the growth of “civic society” 
is necessarily positive for development. Whether “social capital” is positive or negative for 
development – bridging social divides or bonding agents within pre-existing social groups – is an 
empirical issue, which depends on the specific historical context. We do not doubt that in many 
other contexts, time spent in group activities can build trust among individuals across society, 
enabling more effective collective action which improves basic public services, like the delivery 
of water. However, in the specific context of India, our results indicate that it is more likely that 
many group activities reinforce the importance of pre-existing social cleavages (like caste), 
exacerbate the negative impact of inequalities in land ownership, professional status and income 
and undermine the likelihood of community level collective action that might improve  
community well-being – particularly the well-being of the poor –  by relieving people of the 
continuing drudgery of fetching water.   24
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Table 1:  
Water Collection Time by Age, Gender, Social Group and Remuneration 
 
 Rural  Urban 
 









of type in 
households 
gathering 


















of type in 
households 
gathering 










Boys (6-14 yrs)  0.0128 0.0437  48.46  0.0037 0.0167  42.19 
Men (>14 yrs)  0.0704 0.0705  39.96  0.1092 0.0964  39.80 
 
Girls (6-14 yrs)  0.0479 0.2052  50.13  0.0197 0.0964  36.03 
Women (>14 Yrs)  0.8689 0.7461  47.06  0.8674 0.7047  43.06 
 
Scheduled Tribe  0.0907 0.0405  55.17  0.0465 0.2848  58.33 
Scheduled Caste  0.2737 0.3620  47.99  0.0844 0.3821  38.77 
Others   0.6355 0.3472  45.08  0.8691 0.3457  42.30 
 
For Payment   0.0123 0.0042  48.16  0.0136 0.0063  31.92 
 
 
Categories refer to: 
 
R1 & U1:  % of total water collection time of all people performed by persons in category Xi. 
     
R2 & U2:  % of individuals in households that gather any water of type Xi who are  involved in 
water collection  
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Table 2: 
Time Spent on Community, Group, Civic Activities and on Social Interaction 
   Rural     Urban   
 
Time* on “Talking, Gossiping, Quarrelling” 
Average Time (over individuals who spend 
positive time) 
Percentage involved 
Average Time (over the total population) 
 
Time on Social Activities 
Average Time (over individuals who spend 
positive time) 
Percentage involved 
Average Time (over the total population) 
 
Time on Group Activities 
Average Time (over individuals who spend 
positive time) 
Percentage involved 
Average Time (over the total population) 
 
Time on Community Activities 
Average Time (over individuals who spend 
positive time) 
Percentage involved 





















































































































































* All times in minutes/normal day 
Community Activities: Activity Codes 611, 621 
Group Activities: Activity Codes 631, 641, 651, 671, 681 
Social Interaction: Activity Codes 811, 812, 813, 814 
Talking, Gossiping, Quarrelling: Activity Code 951 (Time spent outside the house) 
For descriptions of these activities, see text, notes 18, 19, and 21. 
All average times calculated for adult men and women, i.e. ages 18 or above. 
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Table 3: 
Bootstrapped Probit analysis of the probability that a rural household fetches water 
Dependent Variable: =1 if a rural household fetches water; = 0 if not  
 
Variable Model  A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
















































































































































Theil index of inequality in landholdings 








Coefficient of Variation in landholdings 
among the landed in district





Within district component of Theil index of 








Between district component of Theil index of 








Within district component of square of 
coefficient of variation of monthly per-capita 
expenditure






Between district component of square of 
coefficient of variation of monthly per-capita 
expenditure






Average time spent on talking, gossiping and 







(0.002)    








(0.004)    
Average time spent on community and group 
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Average time spent on community organized 
work in district (minutes)




(0.255)    






(0.008)    
Average time spent by men on talking, 







Average time spent by men on social 







Average time spent by men on community 







Average time spent by men on group activities 







Replenishable ground water per-capita for the 
























Sample Size  12720  12720  12720 12720 12720 
 
Number of Households that fetch water: 2363 (18.58%). The sample size for the regressions (12720) is less than the 
number of rural households in the survey (12750) because we removed a few outliers and erroneous records 
 
Number of replications: 1000 
 
*** 99% Confidence Level  ** 95% Confidence Level      * 90% Confidence Level 
 
Standard Errors in Parentheses. Statistical significance calculated on the basis of normal approximation method. 




a) The Theil index of inequality (R) can be written as (W+B) where the within component is: 
g g g g R Y n Y n W ) / ( Σ =  Yg – Mean income in village g, ng – Population of village g,  
Rg – Theil for the village g, n – Population of the district, Y - Mean income of the district  ) / ( Y n Y n g g  - Village 
g’s share of the total income in district.  
b) The between component is ) / log( ) / ( ) / 1 ( Y Y Y Y n n B g g g g Σ =  
c) As in the case of Theil, the square of the coefficient of variation (C
2 ) can be written as (W+B) where the within 
component is: 
2 2 ) / )( / ( g g g g C Y Y n n W Σ =  The variables are as defined earlier, in the Theil. 
2
g C  is the square of 
the coefficient of variation for the village. 
d) The between component is W C B − =
2  
e) Activity Code 951. Time spent outside the house. 
f) Activity Codes: 811, 812, 813, 814 
g) Activity Codes: 621, 631, 641, 651, 661, 671, 681 
h) Activity Code: 621 
i) Activity Codes: 631, 641, 651, 661, 671, 681 
j) Calculated based upon data from the Central Water Commission. 
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Table 4: 
Bootstrapped Probit analysis of the probability that an urban household fetches water 
Dependent Variable: =1 if an urban household fetches water; = 0 if not 
 
Variable Model  A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
























































































































Within district component of Theil index of 








Between district component of Theil index of 








Within district component of square of 
coefficient of variation of monthly per-capita 
expenditure









Between district component of square of 
coefficient of variation of monthly per-capita 
expenditure







Average time spent on talking, gossiping and 







(0.003)    











Average time spent on group and community 




   
Average time spent on community organized 
work in district (minutes)




(0.549)    
Average time spent on group activities in 




(0.039)    
Average time spent by men on talking, 







Average time spent by men on social 






(0.009)   31
Average time spent by men on community 







Average time spent by men on group activities 







Replenishable ground water per-capita for the 























Sample Size  5830  5830  5830 5830 5830 
 
i) Number of Households that do not fetch water: 671 (11.51%). The sample size for the regressions (5830) is less 
than the number of urban households in the survey (5841) because we removed a few outliers and erroneous records. 
 
ii) *** 99% Confidence Level  ** 95% Confidence Level   *90% Confidence Level 
 
iii) Standard Errors in Parentheses. Statistical significance calculated on the basis of normal approximation method. 
Other approximation methods (percentile, bias corrected) yield similar results. 
 
iv) Number of replications: 1000 
 
v) For the computation of within and between inequalities, see Table 3. 
 
vi) For activity codes used in the computation of the averages, see Table 3.  32
 
Table 5: 






Increase in probability of fetching water due to: 
 
i) A policy of completely egalitarian land redistribution 
 
 
ii) Change from non-professional to professional status 
 
iii) Increase in monthly per-capita expenditure 
a)  10% increase 
b)  20% increase 
 
iv) Ownership of homestead 
 
 
v) Decrease in percentage of Scheduled Caste individuals in 
the district from median to zero 
 
vi) Decrease in percentage of Scheduled Tribe individuals 
from median to zero 
 
vii) Increase in time spent on social activities  
a)  10
th percentile to median 
b)  median to 90
th percentile 
 




ix) Increase in time spent on group activities  
a)  10
th percentile to median 







































































*The number in parentheses and the other number represent the percentage and absolute change in the probability of 
fetching water, respectively. The percentages are calculated on the basis of the base case, i.e. percentage change = 




i) We compute the probability of fetching water for a base household (non-scheduled caste, non-scheduled tribe, 
male headed, landless, homestead owning, laborer household with average dependency ratio. The household lives in 
a district with average values for all the district-level variables - inequality, scheduled caste proportion, scheduled 
tribe proportion etc.). To simulate the impact of the policy, we recalculate this probability by setting the landless 
proportion and the Theil among the landed to zero and making the household landed (i.e. not a laborer).  
   33
ii) We consider cases similar to (i), but without and with professional status. 
 
iii) We consider cases similar to (i), but with expenditures that are 10% and 20% above the average. 
 
v) We consider cases similar to (i), but with different scheduled caste proportions in the district. 
 
vi) We consider cases similar to (i), but with different scheduled tribe proportions in the district. 
 
vii) We consider cases similar to (i) above, but with different values for the time spent on social activities. In (a), we 
look at the impact of moving from a district that is at the 10
th percentile in terms of time spent on social interaction 
(i.e. 6
th lowest among 51 districts) to a district that is the median. In (b), we consider the impact of moving from a 
median district to one that is at the 90
th percentile (i.e. 46
th lowest among 51 districts). 
 
viii) This is similar to (vii). Both the 10
th percentile and the median are zero, so we do not consider an increase from 
10
th percentile to the median. 
 




ii) We compute the probability of fetching water for a base household (non-scheduled caste, non-scheduled tribe, 
male headed, non-homestead owning, non-laborer, with average dependency ratio. The household lives in a district 
with average values for all the district-level variables - inequality, scheduled caste proportion, scheduled tribe 
proportion etc.). We consider professional and non-professional cases.  
 
iii) We consider cases similar to (ii), but with expenditures that are 10% and 20% above the average. 
 
iv) We consider cases similar to (ii), but without and with homestead ownership. 
 
v) We consider cases similar to (i), but with different scheduled caste proportions in the district. 
 
vi) We consider cases similar to (i), but with different scheduled tribe proportions in the district. 
 
viii) We consider cases similar to (ii), but with different values for the time spent on community organized work. As 
in the rural case, both the 10
th percentile and the median are zero, so we do not consider an increase from 10
th 
percentile to the median. 
 
ix) This is similar to (vii), but with different times for group activities. The median group time is zero, so we only 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics of Some Important Variables 
Variable Rural    Urban   
  Mean (Std. Deviation)  Min (Max)  Mean  (Std. Deviation)  Min (Max) 










Household Size  4.206 (105.953)  1.000 (23)  4.041 (88.72324)  1 (21) 










Owns Homestead  0.639 (26.638)  0 (1)  0.416 (25.338)  0 (1) 
Scheduled Caste  0.192 (21.843)  0 (1)  0.101 (15.475)  0 (1) 
Scheduled Tribe  0.184 (21.513)  0 (1)  0.049 (11.103)  0 (1) 
Laborer Household  0.406 (27.247)  0 (1)  0.210 (20.943)  0 (1) 
Professional Household  0.056 (12.746)  0 (1)  0.201 (20.618)  0 (1) 
Female Household Head  0.099 (16.580)  0 (1)  0.086 (14.398)  0 (1) 
Landless Household  0.468  (27.681)  0 (1)     
Percentage of Landless in the district  0.439 (0.179)  0 (0.781)     
Theil index of inequality in 







    
Coefficient of Variation in 







    
Gini index of inequality in 







    
Within district component of Theil 














Between district component of Theil 














Within district component of 














Between district component of 














Gini index of monthly per-capita 









Percentage of Scheduled Caste 









Percentage of Scheduled tribe 




















No. of rural (urban) households: 12750(5841). No. of rural (urban) districts: 51 (52). No. of states: 6    35
Table A2: Bootstrapped Probit analysis of the probability that a rural household fetches water 
Dependent Variable: =1 if an rural household fetches water; = 0 if not 
 
Variable Model  A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
Monthly per-capita expenditure 









































































































Percentage of Scheduled Caste 









Percentage of Scheduled Tribe 









Percentage of landless 











Theil index of inequality in 
landholdings among the landed 









Gini index of inequality in 







   
Coefficient of Variation in 
landholdings among the landed 




Within village component of 
Theil index of inequality of 








Between village component of 
Theil index of inequality of 










Gini index of monthly per-
capita expenditure 
1.038** 
(0.449)   
   
Within village component of 
square of coefficient of 
variation of monthly per-capita 
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Between village component of 
square of coefficient of 
variation of monthly per-capita 




Average time spent on talking, 












Average time spent on social 







Average time spent on 










Average time spent on group 







Average time spent by women 
on talking, gossiping and 







Average time spent by women 







Average time spent by women 
on community organized work 








Average time spent by women 
on group activities in district 







Replenishible ground water per-


























Sample Size  12720  12720  12720  12720  12720 
 
i) Number of Households that fetch water: 2363 (18.58%). The sample size for the regressions (12720) is less than 
the number of rural households in the survey (12750) because we removed a few outliers and erroneous records 
 
ii) *** 99% Confidence Level. ** 95% Confidence Level. *90% Confidence Level 
 
iii) Standard Errors in Parentheses. Statistical significance calculated on the basis of normal approximation method. 
Other approximation methods (percentile, bias corrected) yield similar results. 
 
iv) Number of replications:1000 
 
v) For the computation of within and between inequalities, see Table 3. 
 
vi) For activity codes used in the computation of the averages, see Table 3. 
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Table A3: Bootstrapped Probit analysis of the probability that an urban household fetches water 
Dependent Variable: =1 if an urban household fetches water; = 0 if not 
 
Variable Model  A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
Monthly per-capita expenditure 





























































































Percentage of Scheduled Caste 









Percentage of Scheduled Tribe 






(0.191)   
1.664*** 
(0.175) 
Within village component of 
Theil index of inequality of 










Between village component of 
Theil index of inequality of 










Gini index of monthly per-
capita expenditure 
0.403** 
(0.827)   
   
Within village component of 
square of coefficient of 
variation of monthly per-capita 






Between village component of 
square of coefficient of 
variation of monthly per-capita 






Average time spent on talking, 













Average time spent on social 
activities in district (minutes) 
0.003 





Average time spent on 











Average time spent on group  0.348***      0.351*** 0.370***   38
activities in district (minutes)  (0.037)  (0.033)  (0.040) 
Average time spent by women 
on talking, gossiping and 








Average time spent by women 









Average time spent by women 
on community organized work 








Average time spent by women 









Replenishible ground water per-





























Sample Size  5830  5830  5830  5830  5830 
 
i) Number of Households that fetch water: 2363 (18.58%). The sample size for the regressions (12720) is less than 
the number of rural households in the survey (12750) because we removed a few outliers and erroneous records. 
 
ii) *** 99% Confidence Level. ** 95% Confidence Level. *90% Confidence Level 
 
iii) Standard Errors in Parentheses. Statistical significance calculated on the basis of normal approximation method. 
Other approximation methods (percentile, bias corrected) yield similar results. 
 
iv) Number of replications: 1000 
 
v) For the computation of within and between inequalities, see Table 3. 
 
vi) For activity codes used in the computation of the averages, see Table 3. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 “Optimum standards in most refugee emergencies call for a minimum per capita allocation of 15 litres per day plus 
communal needs and a spare capacity for new arrivals. When hydro-geological or logistic constraints are difficult to 
address, a per capita allocation of 7 litres per person per day should be regarded as the minimum “survival” 
allocation. This quantity will be raised to 15 litres per day as soon as possible.” UNHCR (1992:5) 
 
2 In this paper we use the generic term of water “on tap” to mean water that can be immediately obtained –  most 
often because it is piped into the residence, but also from private courtyard wells or hand pumps in the residence 
[see  McKenzie and Ray (2004:Table1) for a breakdown of the sources of drinking water in India in 1998-99]. 
 
3 One debate in this tradition is about whether command over commodities is best measured – conceptually and in 
actual survey data – by income (i.e. potential consumption) or by actual consumption (perhaps including the services 
of durable goods). A second debate questions whether the definition of the poverty threshold should be set as an 
absolute standard (e.g. the Purchasing Power Parity equivalent of US$1 or US$2 per day per capita) or relative to the 
income or consumption norms of the society (e.g. one half of median equivalent income). A third issue is the 
inability of household data to detect inequalities in “command over commodities” within families, which implies 
that gender based inequities are often ignored. In all this discussion the time cost of obtaining a specific commodity 
– such as water – is ignored. 
 
4 By the criterion of the percentage of the population with sustainable access to an improved water source, the 
UNDP ranks India (at 86%) as far superior to countries like Chad (42%) or Ethiopia (22%)– see Human 
Development Report (2006: pages 307 and 308). 
 
5 A fit male weighing 80 Kilograms (i.e. Osberg) can carry 25 litres of water one kilometre in 18 minutes on flat 
sidewalks –  since it took 11 minutes to walk the empty journey, and 5 minutes to fill buckets, the total time required 
for one round trip was about 34 minutes. The authors conjecture that 25 litres (which weighs 55 pounds, in Imperial 
units) is not far from the maximum practicable weight for a single trip, given the awkwardness of the load. Smaller 
stature, uneven terrain or poorer nutrition – the reality of most people who do this daily – implies that multiple 
journeys with smaller loads would typically be required. A family of four using the UNDP minimum of 20 litres per 
person per day would need eighty litres – which weighs 80 Kilograms (approximately 176.4 pounds in Imperial 
units) and necessarily involves several trips. 
 
6 The personal interview methodology was very labour intensive, but was considered necessary to collect reliable 
diary data from respondents who are, in some cases, illiterate. Gersuny (1998) discusses the advantages of the diary 
methodology, which walks the respondent sequentially through the previous day’s activities, in improving recall and 
imposing aggregate consistency of responses.  An “abnormal” day is defined in the “Instruction Manual for Field 
Staff” (1998: 23) as “that day of the week when guest arrives, any member of the household suddenly falls sick, any 
festival occurs, etc.”. The “weekly variant” is “determined according to the pattern of the major earners holiday. If 
the major earner does not holiday, then school children’s holiday will be taken. If even this is not applicable, then 
day of weekly hat (bazaar) may be taken”. 
 
7 The gendered inequality of time spent in water collection is common to many countries – see HDR (2006:87). 
 
8  Pipe capacity, for example, varies with the pipe’s cross-sectional area (which, if r is the pipe’s radius, is given by 
π r
2 ) while pipe cost typically varies with a pipe’s circumference (which is given by 2π r). 
 
9 Albeit sometimes, as in the UK, the state may define its role as licensing and regulating privately owned local 
water utility monopolies. For a concise summary of the public/private sector debate in water provision see Human 
Development Report 2006 (especially pages 77-107). 
 
10 If all land were owned by a single landlord, the landlord could operate as a price discriminating water monopolist, 
who could extract from her tenants the entire consumer surplus in water distribution. But if land ownership is non-
monopolistic, land owners near the well head can attempt to exploit their market power, but must make irrevocable 
investments to do so.    43
                                                                                                                                                             
11 More generally, given the imperfections of effective democracy in rural areas, supporters of community 
infrastructure may need to mobilize more than 50% + 1 – but the basic point remains, whatever the critical quantile 
of the distribution of voters. 
 
12 Recall that the Gini index is defined by 
2 2 / N u u j i μ − ΣΣ , where μ  is the average benefit, which we 
normalize to 1. 
 
13 On June 30, 2006 a Google Scholar web search restricted to Business, Administration, Finance, and Economics 
returned 56,500 hits on “Water and Social Capital”. An ECONLIT search generated 3,750 hits on “Social Capital”. 
We do not pretend to have read all this. The concept of “social capital” is not universally accepted - e.g. Arrow 
(1999) and Solow (1999) are sceptical of the metaphor of capital in “social capital” and of attempts to measure it. 





15 Social Capital Assessment Tool question 4A1 – Gootaert and Van Bastelaar (2002:191) 
 
16 Even if an individual belongs to a formal group (e.g.  the American Economics Association?), it may not be 
mentioned unless group membership is salient. 
 
17 Narayan and  Pritchett (1999a) note that principal components analysis did not work well in their data, so they 
assume that associational memberships should be weighted by an index of heterogeneity of associational 
membership which is an equally weighted average of a common rescaling of five questions on kin, occupational and 
income heterogeneity, group functioning and membership fees. The implication is that their regression results are 
somewhat sensitive to alternative scaling or weighting assumptions. 
 
18 Community services: 
611. community organised construction and repairs: buildings, roads, dams, wells, ponds etc. and 
621. community organised work: cooking for collective celebrations, etc.  
 
19Group activities: 
631. volunteering with for an organisation (which does not involve working directly for individuals) 
641. volunteer work through organisations extended directly to individuals and groups 
651. participation in meetings of local and informal groups/caste, tribes, professional associations, union, fraternal 
and political organisations 
661 involvement in civic and related responsibilities: voting, rallies, attending meetings, panchayat 
671. informal help to other households 
681 community services not elsewhere classified 
 
20 In the computation of average times, we look at adult men and women, of ages 18 and above.  
 
21 The social activities that we consider are: 
811: Participating in social events: wedding, funerals, births, and other celebrations 
812. Participating in religious activities: church services, religious ceremonies, practices, kirtans, singing, etc. 
813. Participating in community functions in music, dance etc. 
814. Socializing at home and outside the home. 
 
22 Recall from footnote 3 that an “abnormal” day is defined as “that day of the week when guest arrives, any festival 
occurs” and is separately coded. 
 
23 There are 51 rural and 52 urban districts.   44
                                                                                                                                                             
24 In the ITUS data, twelve households were sampled in each village or urban block, implying that we indirectly 
have observations on approximately 1554 local micro communities (1,066 rural and 488 urban). With only twelve 
household observations in each village, sampling variability can be expected to bedevil estimation of characteristics 
of these local communities which are aggregated from household observations at the village level. (Estimation of the 
characteristics of local village society derived from the approximately 50 adult individuals in each village can be 
expected to be more robust.) 
 
25 There are three methods that can be used to compute  )% 1 ( α −   confidence intervals for b: (i) Normal approximation 
method, (ii) percentile method, and (iii) Bias Corrected method. In (i) the assumption is that the sampling (and 
thereby the bootstrapping) distribution is normal. In (ii) the confidence interval is constructed based upon percentiles 
of the bootstrapping distribution. The computations for (iii) are more involved and for details, see the above 
references, which also present formulae for (i) and (ii). In the bootstrapped probit regressions that we perform 
(reported in Tables 3, 4, A2, and A3) the biases are small and the three methods of computing confidence intervals 
yield approximately the same results. Bias estimates and confidence intervals are available upon request. 
 
26 Except activity code 611 (community organized construction and repairs) which includes work on ‘roads, dams, 
wells, ponds, etc.’ 
 
27 Our caution is also partly due to the relatively small reported differentials in monthly expenditure for households 
with large differentials in land owned, in rural areas. The correlation between monthly per-capita expenditure and 
land ownership is also very low (0.16). 
 
28 In the simple model of Section 2, we represented this fixed cost as b0. 
 
29 From the Indian Central Water Commission 
 
30 Within Western social science, this tradition goes back to Weber and Marx. Among modern development 
economists, Myrdal (1968) and Dreze and Sen (2002) are a few of the authors who have discussed how caste and 
class barriers hinder participatory growth in India. See Gupta (1993 a) for an overview of the literature on caste and 
Easterly, Ritzan and Woolcock (2006) for a general discussion of ethnic fractionalization and institutional quality.  
 
31 The more finely one disaggregates “Group activities” into specific types (e.g. 661 involvement in civic and related 
responsibilities: voting, rallies, attending meetings, panchayat), the smaller the sample of participants on the 
surveyed days. Regressions with further disaggregation (e.g. separately identifying 661 activities) – both using the 
original data and in 1,000 bootstrapped iterations – reinforce the conclusions above and are available from the 
authors, but are not reported explicitly here due to concern about small sample size. 
 
32 See e.g. the recent work by Dirks (2001), Gupta (1993 a) and the references therein. 
 
33 The classic reference is Dumont (1970) 
 
34 Sabarwal (1986) makes a similar argument. Also see Harriss (2002), p. 38. 
 
35 See Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for a survey. 
 
36 Since each impact evaluated in Table 5 holds “all else constant”, one cannot simply add up individual impacts to 
obtain the joint impact of, for example, becoming both a ‘professional’ and a home owner. 